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There is debate about whether emotional granularity, the tendency to label emotions
in a nuanced and specific manner, is merely a product of labeling abilities, or a
systematic difference in the experience of emotion during emotionally evocative events.
According to the Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion (CAT) (Barrett, 2006), emotional
granularity is due to the latter and is a product of on-going temporal differences in how
individuals categorize and thus make meaning of their affective states. To address this
question, the present study investigated the effects of individual differences in emotional
granularity on electroencephalography-based brain activity during the experience of
emotion in response to affective images. Event-related potentials (ERP) and event-
related desynchronization and synchronization (ERD/ERS) analysis techniques were
used. We found that ERP responses during the very early (60–90 ms), middle (270–
300 ms), and later (540–570 ms) moments of stimulus presentation were associated
with individuals’ level of granularity. We also observed that highly granular individuals,
compared to lowly granular individuals, exhibited relatively stable desynchronization of
alpha power (8–12 Hz) and synchronization of gamma power (30–50 Hz) during the
3 s of stimulus presentation. Overall, our results suggest that emotional granularity is
related to differences in neural processing throughout emotional experiences and that
high granularity could be associated with access to executive control resources and
a more habitual processing of affective stimuli, or a kind of “emotional complexity.”
Implications for models of emotion are also discussed.
Keywords: emotional granularity, electroencephalography, event-related potentials, event-related
desynchronization and synchronization, affective stimulus processing
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a colleague who, when upset at a slight, reports that he feels angry. Now imagine a
colleague who when upset at a slight reports that he feels angry, anxious, sad, and disgusted all at
once. Whereas the first colleague is having a very specific emotional response, the second is having
a much less specific experience—in essence, he is telling you that he just feels unpleasant. The
tendency to experience emotions in a highly specific manner is known as ‘emotional granularity’
(Barrett et al., 2001; Demiralp et al., 2012) or ‘emotion differentiation’ (Boden et al., 2013; Kashdan
et al., 2015). Growing evidence reveals the importance of this individual difference for emotion
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regulation (Barrett et al., 2001), decreasing aggressive behavior
(Pond et al., 2012), and mental health (Demiralp et al., 2012;
Kashdan et al., 2015). Indeed, training individuals to recognize
one’s emotions as discrete and specific is a core aspect of many
cognitive psychotherapies (Garber et al., 2016). However, no
research to date has explored the neural mechanisms underlying
individual differences in emotional granularity during affective
stimulus processing.
Since individual differences in emotional granularity might
manifest as differences throughout the experience of an emotion,
we used temporally sensitive electroencephalography (EEG)-
based methods to test hypotheses about the psychological
and neural mechanisms of emotional granularity. Specifically,
we conducted a lab-based EEG study of brain activity in
individuals high and low in emotional granularity and measured
granularity using an independent measure the night before
participants partook in the computerized experiment and EEG
recording.
Emotional Granularity: An Index of
Emotional Complexity
Emotional granularity (hereafter, granularity) is the ability to
experience emotions in a precise manner and is a kind of
‘emotional complexity associated with emotional and social
wellness’ (for reviews, see Lindquist and Barrett, 2008a; Kashdan
et al., 2015). For instance, growing research demonstrates that
individuals high in granularity, who experience their emotions
as discrete and specific, possess greater emotion regulation skills
(Barrett et al., 2001) and greater resilience in the face of stress
(Tugade et al., 2004) when compared to individuals low in
granularity. Greater granularity is also associated with less alcohol
abuse in young adults (Kashdan and Ferssizidis, 2010), less
aggressive behavior in anger-inducing situations (Pond et al.,
2012), and an ability to prevent emotions from biasing moral
judgments (Cameron et al., 2013). By contrast, low granularity
individuals, who experience their emotions as more diffuse and
general, are more likely to hold diagnoses of psychopathologies
ranging from borderline personality disorder (Suvak et al., 2011),
to major depression (Demiralp et al., 2012) to anorexia nervosa
(Selby et al., 2014).
Hypothesized Mechanisms of Granularity
Despite important work demonstrating the implications of
granularity, no research to date has assessed its psychological
or neural mechanisms. It is proposed that one psychological
mechanism underlying differences in granularity are differences
in individuals’ use of concept knowledge about emotion to make
meaning of their affective state in a given situation (Lindquist
and Barrett, 2008b; Kashdan et al., 2015). Concept knowledge
is what a person knows about the categories of ‘anger,’ ‘disgust,’
‘fear,’ etc. and is acquired in part via prior experience and in part
by language (Lindquist, 2013; Lindquist et al., 2015a). According
to the Conceptual Act Theory (CAT) of emotion (Barrett, 2006;
Lindquist, 2013), an individual experiences an emotion when
he or she makes meaning of his or her current affective state
using this knowledge. In this view, emotions are ‘conceptual
acts’ (Barrett, 2006, 2009) that require the integration of external
sensations (visual, auditory, tactile sensations, etc.) and internal
sensations (pleasant vs. unpleasant and highly vs. lowly aroused
feelings in the body) with concept knowledge. For instance, a
person might experience an unpleasant, highly aroused feeling
as fear when knowledge about the concept ‘fear’ is relatively
more accessible than knowledge about ‘anger’ or other emotions
(Lindquist and Barrett, 2008a).
If granularity is related to use of conceptual knowledge,
then there may be at least two separate mechanisms that
contribute to individual differences in granularity. First, we
hypothesize that the ability to experience one’s emotions as
discrete and specific, as occurs in high granularity individuals, is
contingent on the complexity of someone’s conceptual knowledge
about emotions (Lindquist and Barrett, 2008a,b; Kashdan et al.,
2015). Individuals who have previously encoded more specific
concept knowledge about, say, the features and situations that
fear occurs in, will be more likely to categorize and thus
experience an unpleasant affective state as fear in a threatening
context.
Second, we hypothesize that separate from the content of
a person’s conceptual knowledge, his/her ability to wield that
conceptual knowledge in the moment will impact granularity
(Barrett et al., 2004; Lindquist and Barrett, 2008b; Kashdan
et al., 2015). A person’s ability to wield concept knowledge—
that is, to access and flexibly use conceptual knowledge—to make
meaning of his/her affective experience is ultimately limited by
executive control (Barrett et al., 2004; Lindquist and Barrett,
2008a,b; Kashdan et al., 2015). Executive control allows a person
to simultaneously access on-going affective feelings and concept
knowledge from long-term memory. It is hypothesized that
executive control is related to an individual’s working memory
capacity (WMC), which governs his/her ability to retrieve
information from long-term memory and to inhibit and select
between competing sources of semantic information (Engle,
2002; Barrett et al., 2004). In the case of granularity, greater WMC
may allow individuals to hold information about their current
affective state in mind while they retrieve emotion concept
knowledge (i.e., contextual information, semantic knowledge
about emotion categories), facilitating the online categorization
of their affective state. In fact, evidence (Barrett et al.,
unpublished) suggests that people higher in granularity tend
to be higher in WMC. In a behavioral study, granularity was
assessed over the course of a 28-day experience sampling period
in which 82 participants rated their experiences of emotion
adjectives (sad, nervous, angry, and guilty) 10 times per day on
a palm-top computer. These ratings were then used to compute
person-correlations (p-correlations; Barrett et al., 2001) that
indexed the relatedness of the emotion adjectives within each
person, across ratings over time. In a subsequent laboratory
session, participants completed several different measures of
WMC including standard operation span and reading-span
measures popularized by Rosen and Engle (1997) and a novel
working memory task for emotional information (E-SPAN).
Confirmatory factor analysis indicated that the three measures
tapped a single WMC construct and so the measures were
thus combined into a single index of WMC that was used as
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a predictor of participants’ level of granularity. As predicted
by the CAT, individuals who were higher in WMC were more
granular in daily life: that is, they were less apt to simultaneously
say that they were sad, nervous, angry, and guilty at the
same time across multiple sampling instances and instead used
emotion adjectives specifically and distinctly at different points
throughout the day to describe their experiences. Although
preliminary, these findings suggest that individual differences in
participants’ ability to wield conceptual knowledge, as mediated
by cognitive abilities such as WMC, play an important role in
granularity.
Despite this initial behavioral evidence, very little research
to date has explicitly explored the online use of these or
other possible mechanisms of granularity. One means of
examining the mechanisms of granularity is to record the
neural activity that is related to individual differences in
granularity as individuals experience emotions in real time. No
studies to date have specifically measured and modeled the
relationship between emotional granularity and neural activity.
However, neuroimaging meta-analyses of emotional experiences
are instructive as to which neural processes might be predicted,
as are the few neuroimaging studies that explicitly examine
functional brain activity as it relates to constructs indexing other
forms of emotional complexity.
Consistent with the hypothesized mechanisms of granularity,
meta-analyses of the neuroimaging literature derived from
functional magnetic resonance imaging and positron emission
tomography studies (Kober et al., 2008; Vytal and Hamann,
2010; Lindquist et al., 2012; Wager et al., 2015) demonstrate
that emotional experiences are associated with increased activity
within brain regions related to concept representation and use.
That is, brain regions associated with representing concept
knowledge, and brain regions associated with the executive
control resources necessary for accessing and using conceptual
knowledge all generally show consistent increases in activity
across emotional experiences (for meta-analyses see Kober
et al., 2008; Vytal and Hamann, 2010; Lindquist et al., 2012;
Wager et al., 2015). Specifically, there is consistent increase
in activity within a distributed network associated with the
representation of concepts (i.e., the semantic system; dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, lateral temporal
cortex, anterior temporal lobe; Binder et al., 2009) across
experiences and perceptions of emotion (see Figure 2 in Lindquist
et al., 2015b for overlap between regions consistently involved in
semantics and emotion). Furthermore, there is increased activity
within a set of brain regions involved in executive control and
WMC that aid in the retrieval and use of those concepts (i.e.,
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex;
dACC; Thompson-Schill et al., 1997; Miller and Cohen, 2001;
Badre et al., 2005; Grindrod et al., 2008) during emotional
experiences and perceptions.
Although there are no studies specifically examining whether
individuals high in granularity draw on these regions more
than individuals low in granularity, a study assessing the
neural correlates of a similar construct, “emotional awareness,”
suggests that individuals higher in emotional awareness draw
on a brain region involved in executive control more than
individuals lower in emotional awareness. A positron emission
tomography study revealed that individuals who score higher
on the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS) (Lane
et al., 1990) have greater activity within the dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex (dACC) while watching emotional videos and
recalling emotional experiences (Lane et al., 1998) than do
individuals who score lower on the LEAS. The LEAS assesses
people’s propositional knowledge about the emotions that they
and others would feel in certain hypothetical situations. Like
granularity, the LEAS is considered a measure of emotional
complexity (although the two are not correlated, they might
both be indicators of the broader construct of emotional
complexity; see Lindquist and Barrett, 2008b for a review).
Given that the dACC is broadly implicated in executive control
and response selection (for reviews see, Holroyd and Yeung,
2012; Shenhav et al., 2016), individuals higher in levels of
emotional awareness, like those high in granularity, may more
characteristically draw on WMC and executive control to select
amongst competing sources of conceptual knowledge during
emotional experiences.
A lesion study (Barbey et al., 2012) is also suggestive that
regions associated with concept use, WMC, and executive
control are related to greater levels of emotional complexity.
Barbey et al. (2012) used voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping
to identify lesion sites associated with deficits in emotional
intelligence across a database of 152 lesion patients. Emotional
intelligence was measured via the Mayer Salovey Caruso
Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) (Mayer, 2002), which is
a performance-based measure that assesses participants’ ability
to perceive emotions in themselves and others, communicate
feelings, understand feelings, and manage feelings. Again,
although they measure different things, the MSCEIT and
granularity are conceptually related and may together be
indicative of greater emotional complexity. Critically, consistent
with the predictions of the CAT, lower MSCEIT scores were
associated with lesions in a distributed set of frontal, temporal,
and parietal regions also associated with semantic representation
and use, WMC, perceptual organization and processing speed.
In particular, lesions within regions such as the ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex previously mentioned to be associated with
semantic retrieval and executive control were predictive of low
MSCEIT scores in this patient sample.
Although these functional neuroimaging and lesion-based
studies are suggestive, they did not specifically assess granularity.
Nor are these spatially sensitive measures necessarily the best
means of testing hypotheses about the mechanisms of granularity.
The CAT hypothesizes that representations of affect and the use
of conceptual knowledge co-act during the experience of emotion
(Barrett, 2006; Lindquist et al., 2012; Lindquist, 2013). Affect does
not necessarily precede conceptualization in a linear sequence;
rather, the two iteratively shape and constrain one another during
a process of constraint satisfaction (Lindquist and Barrett, 2008a;
Lindquist et al., 2012). As a result, brain activity during discrete,
highly granular emotional experiences will reflect activation of
both early neural processes related to affect, as well as both early
and later processing related to access to and use of concept
knowledge. Fortunately, EEG can address questions about the
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mechanisms of granularity by capturing activity throughout an
emotional experience in a temporally sensitive fashion (e.g., as
fast as 1ms after the onset of an emotional stimulus).
No studies to date have focused on the temporal dynamics
of neural activity associated with emotional granularity. Thus,
our hypotheses about the temporal dynamics of neural activity
associated with granularity are based exclusively on theory and
the existing EEG literature linking certain ERP components and
frequency domains to the psychological processes of interest
(see Table 1). Under the CAT, high granularity individuals
would display greater brain electrophysiological responses
consistent with the use of concept knowledge and WMC
throughout the timeframe of an emotional experience. We
operationalize emotion experience here as the timeframe during
which participants are processing an affective stimulus. We
make specific predictions for specific event-related potential
(ERP) and event-related desynchronization/synchronization
(ERD/ERS) outcomes below.
Electroencephalography (EEG) Methods
to Investigate Emotional Process
The present study used two quantitative EEG methods to
investigate brain activity in response to emotional experiences:
ERPs and ERD/ERS. Each method has different value in
inspecting neural activity and is differentially linked to the
psychological mechanisms hypothesized to support granularity.
Table 1 explains the general functionality and hypothesized
emotion-related functionality of each method.
Event Related Potentials (ERPs)
Event related potential is the electrophysiological measure of
neural activity. The sudden onset of a stimulus evokes prominent
electrical peaks on the scalp, and these electrical peaks are
measured as ERPs (Blackwood and Muir, 1990). Increased ERP
amplitude is considered to reflect the increased engagement
of cortical brain areas and the psychological processes they
correspondingly support. The fluctuation of electrical power is
represented in the time domain, and ERP benefits from the high
temporal resolution of the EEG method.
Different ERP components are thought to correspond to
different psychological processes relevant to the construction
of emotion under the CAT (see Table 1). The first, early ERP
components (∼200 ms) are known to be very sensitive to the
perceptual features of a stimulus. The early reactions in posterior
regions are not voluntary but very quick, effortless, automatic
evaluation processes initiated by the frontal lobes (Comerchero
and Polich, 1999). There are ongoing debates about whether
high-level visual perception is represented within this time frame,
but the consensus is that coarse visual perception happens before
100 ms, with top-down visual processing of stimuli reflected after
100 ms (see Rossion and Caharel, 2011). These early ERPs might
thus reflect selective attention to those stimuli that have already
been identified for further processing by the visual system (for
a discussion of how projections to orbitofrontal cortex shape
visual perception, see Barrett and Bar, 2009). For instance, the
P1 and N1 are thought to index early visual processing within
extrastriate visual cortex, and respond to the composition, color,
and spatial frequency of a stimulus (Olofsson et al., 2008). These
ERPs also respond selectively to stimuli greater in valence and
arousal as compared to neutral stimuli, and are influenced by
selective attention (see Olofsson et al., 2008 for a review).
Subsequent ERP components in the middle range (200–
300 ms) represent “cognitive control” (Folstein and Van Petten,
2008) processes, a concept that incorporates use of working
memory, initiation of behavioral responses and inhibition of pre-
potent responses. Given links between granularity and WMC
resources involved in emotion concept retrieval and use (Barrett
et al., 2004; Lindquist and Barrett, 2008b; Kashdan et al., 2015) we
predict that amplitudes of these components will differ based on
participants’ level of granularity. For instance, the P2 and N2 in
fronto-central and temporo-occipital sites are thought to reflect
executive control processes (Codispoti et al., 2006; Bradley et al.,
2007). The closely related early posterior negativity (EPN;∼200–
300 ms) over central and temporo-occipital sites is thought to
reflect “natural selective attention” to salient stimuli (Dolcos and
Cabeza, 2002; Schupp et al., 2004; Olofsson et al., 2008). Critically,
these middle ERPs also respond selectively to the arousal content
of a stimulus (see Olofsson et al., 2008), consistent with the
interpretation that stimuli that warrant attention, especially
emotional stimuli, selectively activate these components.
Finally, ERPs in the late range (300 ms∼) are associated
with an “informational processing cascade” when attentional
TABLE 1 | Functionality of electroencephalography (EEG) methods.
Method Temporal
resolution
Measure Span of
interest
General functionality Hypothesized emotion-related
functionality
ERP Higher (as low as 1 ms) Amplitude fluctuations
evoked by stimulus
Short
(∼1 s)
Early (e.g., P1, N1,
N170)
Perceptual feature
extraction
Early selective attention to
affective stimuli
Middle (e.g., P2, N2) Executive control,
selective attention
Retrieving concept
knowledge for evaluation of
affective state
Late (e.g., P3, N4, Late
Positive Potential)
Semantic
processing,
memory, evaluation
Using concept knowledge
for evaluation of affective
state
ERD/ERS Lower [few multiple of
ERPs (Knösche and
Bastiaansen, 2002)]
Decrease or increase of
induced power in given
frequency band
Long
(1 s∼)
Activation or suppression of cortical activity. Alpha band oscillation is related to
the access to concept knowledge. Gamma band is associated with processing
of affective stimuli.
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and memory processes are engaged to process the meaning of
a stimulus (Polich, 2007), and presumably the meaning of a
person’s reaction to that stimulus. For instance, P3 has been
suggested to be the result of various executive functions such
as: content evaluation (Soltani and Knight, 2000), short-term
memory storage (Conroy and Polich, 2007), and decision-making
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). Consistent with the idea that the
P3 relates to information processing, both the valence and
arousal content of a stimulus (relative to neutral content) is
associated with greater P3 responses (Olofsson et al., 2008).
The related midline late positive potential (LPP; >400 ms)
is similarly thought to be involved in “motivated attention”
and executive control (Hajcak et al., 2009). For instance, in
emotion, the LPP has been indicated in emotion regulation
when alternate meaning is made of stimuli (i.e., the emotional
meaning of stimuli is reappraised) (Hajcak and Nieuwenhuis,
2006; Moser et al., 2006; Foti and Hajcak, 2008). Finally, the N4 is
a negative component that is linked to meaning processing, or the
integration of meaning extracted from multiple modalities (Kutas
and Federmeier, 2011). Insofar as individuals high in granularity
are recruiting attentional and executive control resources for
categorization of the meaning of affective states to a greater
extent than individuals low in granularity, we predict that high
granularity individuals will have greater amplitudes within this
later range.
We examine ERPs in high and low granularity individuals
across several different emotion categories (awe, excitement, fear,
and disgust), but we do not have a priori hypotheses about
how viewing different images normed to induce specific ‘discrete
emotions’ will influence ERPs or how granularity will interact
with emotion category to influence ERPs. To our knowledge,
there is little research examining ERPs for specific discrete
emotions, although there is a fair amount of research examining
ERPs to the valence (positive vs. negative) and arousal (high
vs. low activation) qualities of affective stimuli (see Olofsson
et al., 2008 for a review). The functional magnetic resonance
imaging literature demonstrates that processes representing
valence and arousal, as well as access to and use of conceptual
knowledge are generally involved across different discrete
emotions (Lindquist et al., 2012; Touroutoglou et al., 2015;
Wager et al., 2015). We thus do not predict emotion-specific
ERP outcomes nor specific interactions between granularity and
emotion category. Thus, any main effects of emotion category or
granularity × emotion category interactions observed should be
considered exploratory and subject to limited interpretation in
the absence of replication.
Event-Related Desynchronization and
Synchronization (ERD/ERS)
Event-related desynchronization and ERS indicate how much
activity within a specific frequency band has been decreased
(ERD) or increased (ERS) when an event takes a place.
Specifically, ERD indicates that neural generators of a specific
frequency are actively desynchronized from others. The result is
decreased rhythmic activity, which indicates increased cortical
activity. ERS, on the other hand, indicates the opposite
activity. Neural generators of a specific frequency are actively
synchronized with others, resulting in increased rhythmic activity
and decreased cortical activity (Nam et al., 2011). These processes
are relevant to the construction of emotion under the CAT of
emotion (see Table 1) and we predict that ERD/ERS will differ
based on participants’ level of granularity.
Event-related desynchronization or ERS is typically measured
in different frequency bands, divided into delta (0.5–4 Hz), theta
(4–8 Hz), alpha (8–13 Hz), beta (13–30 Hz), and gamma (over
30 Hz) bands. Following Jaušovec et al. (2001) and Jaušovec
and Jaušovec (2005), who examined correlates of emotional
intelligence as measured by the MSCEIT, we focus specifically on
the ERD of the alpha band power. Alpha power has long been
associated with most executive control processes, such as working
memory and is also associated with selective attention, and
perception, more generally. For instance, ERD of alpha oscillation
is thought to represent ‘enhanced information transfer’ during
creativity tasks as individuals draw on top-down control of
information from working memory (Benedek et al., 2011). More
relevant to emotion, Jaušovec et al. (2001) and Jaušovec and
Jaušovec (2005) assessed the association between alpha ERD
and emotional intelligence using the identification of emotions
portion of the MSCEIT (Mayer, 2002). They observed less alpha
ERD in individuals who were high vs. average in emotional
intelligence when individuals were labeling emotions depicted
in posed facial expressions. Their conclusion was that, as a
form of intelligence drawing on resources typically involved in
verbal intelligence, individuals high in emotional intelligence
showed greater “neural efficiency” during the labeling of faces.
These findings mirror those observed when highly vs. lowly
intelligent individuals perform difficult cognitive tasks (Grabner
et al., 2006). This logic is consistent with our hypothesis that
granularity involves greater access to and use of conceptual
knowledge by employing executive control processes such as
WMC.
We also examined differences in gamma ERS between
highly and lowly granular individuals during affective picture
viewing in the present study. Gamma oscillations are related
to a broad range of processes such as feature integration,
attention, stimulus selection, integration of sensory inputs
and sensorimotor activities, movement preparation, and
memory formation (Knyazev, 2007) and synchronization is
thought to reflect greater cortical processing reflecting these
functions.
Because ERD/ERS is computed over a longer time frame
than ERPs (> ∼1 s) and thus reflects sustained processing, we
predicted that individuals low in granularity would have more
sustained activity of executive control processes over the course of
the entire emotional experience, as reflected by more alpha ERD
and more gamma ERS. This result is consistent with the “neural
efficiency” account (Jaušovec and Jaušovec, 2005; Grabner et al.,
2006) which claims that more intelligent people have less cortical
activation during difficult tasks than do less intelligent people.
In essence, we predicted that high granularity individuals would
require cognitive operations early in an emotional experience
to make meaning of affective states as specific emotions, but
then require less sustained processing of executive attention
resources than lowly granular individuals for the remainder of
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the emotional experience. Low granularity individuals, on the
other hand, would require more sustained processing to make
meaning of their affective responses to the affective stimuli. Like
Jaušovec and Jaušovec’s (2005) findings, this finding would reflect
the idea that highly granular individuals are more ‘emotionally
intelligent’ and would be consistent with the idea that granularity
is a stable form of emotional complexity (Lindquist and Barrett,
2008a; Kashdan et al., 2015).
As in the case of the ERP analysis, we also examined
main effects of emotion category on ERD/ERS and interactions
between granularity and emotion category on ERD/ERS, but we
do not have a priori hypotheses about these outcomes. Thus,
any main effects of emotion category or granularity × emotion
category interactions observed should be considered exploratory
and subject to limited interpretation in the absence of
replication.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 33 (11 female) participants from a local university
participated in the EEG experiment for class credit. The average
age was 21.52 years (SD = 2.11 years). Thirty out of the 33
participants were right-handed. There were no participants with
previous neurological disease. Participants gave their written
consent after a detailed explanation of the experiment procedure,
which was approved by the University’s Institutional Review
Board.
Apparatus
Modified Day Reconstruction Method
All participants completed an online survey designed to assess
their degree of granularity the night before completing the lab-
based measure of emotional experience and EEG recording. The
survey consisted of demographic questions and the modified
day reconstruction method (DRM by Kahneman et al., 2004).
The survey was anticipated to take approximately 45 min to
complete.
When answering the modified DRM, the participants were
asked to recall up to five episodes from the morning, five
episodes from the afternoon, and five episodes from the evening
of the day before the survey (2 days before the experiment).
For each episode, they were asked: what they were doing,
where they were, and whom they were interacting with. Finally,
they indicated to what level (from 0 to 6) they experienced
each of 20 emotion categories while they were experiencing
the episode. Ten emotion categories were positive (amusement,
awe, contentment, excitement, gratitude, happiness, love, pleased,
pride, and serenity), and the other 10 were negative (anger,
boredom, disgust, dissatisfied, downhearted, embarrassment,
fear, gratitude, sadness, and tired) to fully sample the range of
affective space. As a result, each participant rated 20 emotions
during up to 15 episodes.
Participants’ experience sampling reports were then used to
calculate their degree of granularity in daily life. As per the
literature, granularity was computed as the co-variation between
participants’ use of emotion terms across emotional experiences
in the day they were reporting on (Barrett et al., 2001; Demiralp
et al., 2012). More specifically, average intraclass correlations
(ICCs) were calculated from participants’ self-reports of emotion
categories across episodes. ICCs are standardly used to calculate
granularity (Tugade et al., 2004; Kimhy et al., 2014). ICCs
of positive emotion categories and ICCs of negative emotion
categories were separately calculated and averaged for each
participant to make a single granularity value. A low ICC value
indicates that the participant can differentiate discrete emotional
categories and express their emotional experiences with different
emotion terms. On the other hand, high ICC value means that
the participant use terms interchangeably to communication
their emotional state. Thus, the ICCs were subtracted from 1
for ease of interpretation to make higher values correspond to
more differentiation, or granularity. The participants’ average
granularity was 0.78 (SD= 0.16).
Affective Picture Stimuli
For the EEG data collection, a total of 50 images (10 images for
each of five emotional categories including awe, excitement, fear,
disgust, and also neutral control images) were selected from the
International Affective Picture System (IAPS by Lang et al., 1999)
based on norms from Mikels et al. (2005). Awe, excitement, fear,
and disgust were chosen as discrete emotion categories, because
these categories are thought to be relatively comparable in terms
of arousal in a standard emotional circumplex. Participants
saw blocked sets of images that induced awe, excitement, fear,
disgust, and neutral, although the specific order of images was
randomized within each emotion block.
Figure 1 shows valence and arousal values of emotional
stimuli used in the present experiment. Despite attempting to
match stimuli on both valence and arousal, it was impossible to
fully do so. The images similar in valence were distinguishable
when plotted on awe-excitement space or on fear-disgust space.
For example, Awe and excitement image norms did not differ in
terms of valence [t(18) = 0.80, p = 0.43] but differed in level of
arousal [t(18) = 4.30, p < 0.001]. Fear and disgust images were
also not different in valence [t(18) = 0.98, p = 0.34], but differed
in level of arousal [t(18) = 3.85, p < 0.01]. Arousal was also
higher for negative stimuli when compared to positive stimuli
[t(38) = −4.11, p < 0.001]. Differences in valence and arousal
of stimuli thus cannot be ruled out as contributors to any main
effects of emotion category or granularity × emotion category
interactions observed.
Procedure
Figure 2 summarizes the overall procedure of the experiment.
All participants completed online surveys (modified day
reconstruction) on the day before the EEG data collection. EEG
data collection was separated into two identical sessions with 50
trials each and a 3 min rest session in between. Signals from
the first 1-min were dumped, and the next 1 min of data were
used as referencing data and baseline correction. The participant
took rest with open eyes during the referencing period. In
each trial, a participant viewed an affective image for 3 s after
seeing 2 s of fixation cross, and took a rest for 10 s after
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FIGURE 1 | Valence and arousal of emotional stimuli used in the experiment.
FIGURE 2 | Procedure of the present experiment.
viewing the image. An additional rest time of 20 s maximum
was provided when the participant’s EEG signals did not return
to rest (i.e., more than 5% of EEG signals were outside the
2σ of the signal collected during the reference period). After
the signal collection was completed, the participant rated each
affective image based on their emotional experience during the
data collection. In particular, participants sat on the same chair
used for the EEG recording and were given survey papers and
a pen. The survey papers contained all 50 images presented
during the EEG recording. For each image, participants chose one
emotional word from neutral, awe, excitement, fear, and disgust,
and specified the strength of the selected emotion (on a 0–6
scale).
Manipulation Check
Figure 3 shows what percentages of images were successful
in eliciting the emotion from Mikels’ et al. (2005) norms in
our sample of 33 participants. We also broke down rates of
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FIGURE 3 | Intended emotion of stimuli and actually evoked emotions for each intended emotion.
endorsements between highly and lowly granular individuals to
ensure that there were not systematic differences between the
two groups in their agreement about whether a given stimulus
elicited feelings of specific emotions. We observed few differences
in highly vs. lowly granular people in terms of mean endorsement
of the individual stimuli (whose granularity value was greater
than 1 standard deviation above or below the sample mean,
respectively). It may seem counter-intuitive that highly and lowly
granular people showed similar patterns of endorsement for the
awe-inspiring, exciting, fearful and disgusting images. However,
granularity is an index of the co-occurrence of multiple same-
valence emotions across instances when participants are able to
endorse multiple same-valence emotion categories at the same
time (e.g., low granularity individuals say they are feeling both
awe and excitement at the same time across multiple instances of
pleasant emotions). Thus, we would not expect to see systematic
differences in a task such as this manipulation check in which
participants were asked to choose only a single label using a
forced-choice method from a small set (awe, excitement, fear,
disgust, and neutral) on one instance.
Data Acquisition and Signal Processing
The participants were seated in a comfortable chair 50′′ in
front of the TV monitor that images were to be displayed on.
Participants wore an EEG cap embedded with 16 electrodes
covering Fp1/Fp2, F7/F8, FC3/FC4, T7/T8, P7/P8, FT7/FT8,
P3/P4, C3/C4 areas, based on the modified 10–20 systems
of the International Federation (Niedermeyer and da Silva,
2005). Fpz was used as a ground, and left ear lobe was used
as a reference. Because the reference was closer to the left
hemisphere, the amplitude of ERP on this side might have been
decreased. However, as we analyzed four brain regions (i.e.,
frontal, central, temporal, and posterior) that are symmetric, the
effect of this asymmetric reference was minimized. The areas
were chosen based on the Brodmann Area (BA), based on a
region’s involvement across meta-analyses of the neuroimaging
literature on emotion (Kober et al., 2008; Lindquist et al.,
2012).
Signal was amplified with a g.USBamp amplifier from g.tec
Medical Engineering, band-pass filtered between 0.1 and 50 Hz
and digitized at a rate of 256 Hz, using g.tec LabVIEW modules.
In this experiment, trials with amplitudes exceeding ±35 µV
measured after stimulus onset were excluded from analysis. The
threshold 35 µV is an average of 99.7% confident intervals of
all participants. As a result, 3.25% of total trials were removed.
Each confidence interval was calculated by sampling all data
points collected during −200 ∼ 1000 ms epoch and estimating
µ ± 3σ. This value was enough to remove the effect of eye
blinks that causes voltage over 60 µV. In addition, collected EEG
data underwent Common Average Reference (CAR) calculation,
where average amplitude of signals from every electrode site was
used as a reference.
Data Analysis
Event Related Potential (ERP)
First, we categorized 16 channels into the following four brain
regions and averaged the activation of cortex within each region:
frontal (Fp1/Fp2/F7/F8), temporal (FT7/FT8/T7/T8), central
(FC3/FC4/C3/C4), and posterior (P3/P4/P7/P8). Then, for each
participant, 20 epochs for each of four discrete emotions and
neutral states were obtained. The length of each epoch was
600 ms, starting from stimulus onset (0 ms). An average of 20
epochs became the representative ERP waveform for the emotion.
Then, the 600 ms epoch was separated into 20 time bins (30 ms
long each), and the average ERP within each bin was calculated, as
binning in narrow bins enhances resolution lost from averaging
across participants (Poli et al., 2010).
Event Related Desynchronization/Synchronization
(ERD/ERS)
Four groups of brain regions (frontal, temporal, central, and
posterior) were used for analysis, as in the ERP analysis. To
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compute ERD/ERS, all trials were band-pass filtered by the
frequency band of interest: alpha (8–12 Hz) or gamma (30–
50 Hz). Filtered signals were squared and then averaged over
the total number of trials to reduce noise. The length of epoch
was 4000 ms (from −1000 to 3000 ms). The first 1000 ms
interval was the reference, while the next 3000 ms was the
interval of interest. The power of 3000 ms was averaged for
10 time bins with length of 300 ms each (Avanzini et al.,
2012). Using the standard ERD/ERS calculation (Pfurtscheller
and Aranibar, 1979), the quantification of ERD/ERS was
carried out in four steps: (1) bandpass filtering for all
event-related trials, (2) squaring the amplitude samples to
obtain power samples, (3) averaging power samples across all
trials, and (4) averaging time samples to smooth data and
reduce variability (Pfurtscheller and Lopes da Silva, 1999).
ERD, ERS = A− R
R
× 100%
R is the average power during the reference period (i.e.,
from −1000 to 0 ms), and A is the average power in
the interval of interest (i.e., 0–3000 ms). Decrease in the
value (i.e., ERD) indicates that there is decrease in power,
and increase in the value (i.e., ERS) indicates that there is
increase in power. We focused on alpha ERD and gamma
ERS.
Statistical Analysis
We hypothesized that emotional stimulus processing would be
influenced by granularity, brain region, and the emotion category
evoked by a given image. We used regression models in order
to model the continuous nature of granularity scores. First, the
averaged ERP or ERD/ERS value was separately analyzed for
each time bin. There are three variables and their interactions:
granularity, brain region, and emotion category. Granularity is a
continuous variable centered around the mean, brain region is
a factor variable with four levels (frontal, temporal, central, and
posterior) with temporal as a reference, and discrete emotion is
a factor variable with five levels (awe, excite, fear, disgust, and
neutral) with neutral as a reference.
RESULTS
Effects of Granularity and Emotion on
ERP Patterns
Figure 4 shows ERP waveforms of highly granular (granularity
higher than ‘mean + 1 standard deviation’) and lowly granular
(granularity lower than ‘mean − 1 standard deviation’) people
in four brain regions: central, frontal, parietal, and temporal.
In general, participants showed an early positive peak near
150 ms (P1), a negative peak near 180 ms (N1), a middle
positive peak near 240 ms (P2), a negative peak near 300 ms
(N2), a positive peak near 350 ms (P3), a negative peak near
400 ms (N400), and a late positive peak near 510 ms (LPP).
The amplitude greatly decreased to a negative amplitude after
the late positive peak, resembling ERP waveforms reported
in other studies (e.g., Costanzo and McArdle, 2013). The
main effect of granularity was significant between 60–90 ms
(β = 2.01, F = 10.03, p = 0.0016), 270–300 ms (β = −3.86,
F = 20.43, p < 0.0001), and 540–570 ms (β = 3.29, F = 10.72;
p = 0.0011), when we used alpha level 0.0025 (Bonferroni
correction for 20 time bins). As described in Figure 4, this
led to more negative early ERPs in the lowly granular group,
a more negative N2 peak of the highly granular group,
and a fast ERP drop after the LPP of the highly granular
group.
As shown in Figure 5, the main effect of emotion was
significant after 330 ms until 570 ms (p < 0.0001 in all time
bins; F = 9.72, F = 11.17; F = 12.13; F = 14.88; F = 15.84;
F = 14.23; F = 15.75; F = 13.97), indicating that differences
between emotion categories emerged only after these middle-
to-late ERPs. See Table 2. There was no interaction effect
between granularity and brain regions or the interaction between
emotion and brain regions in any time bin, although there were
main effects of brain regions (between 180–390 ms and 480–
600 ms).
Although not predicted a priori, we found interaction effects
between granularity and emotion (summarized in Table 3). The
results suggest that an individual’s level of granularity had an
early- to mid-time frame moderating effect on brain signals
responding to the experience of different emotion categories.
Given that we did not have a priori hypotheses about how
granularity would interact with specific emotion categories, we
reserve making strong interpretations of these findings, but they
suggest that the degree to which a person characteristically draws
on conceptual knowledge of emotion might interact with the
specific emotion content being experienced. A caveat here is that
these effects could be a result of the methods used and should
be limited to inferences about emotional picture viewing and
may not extend to more ecologically valid contexts (e.g., social
emotional interactions in daily life).
Granularity and Emotion Effects on
ERD/ERS
The epoch of this analysis was between stimulus onset and
3000 ms. The epoch was segmented into ten 300 ms time bins.
We first analyzed alpha ERD. The power of alpha band (8–
12 Hz) decreased (ERD) during the first 600 ms after the stimulus
onset as described in Figure 6. Lowly granular people particularly
showed more ERD, an index of greater cortical activation.
Such difference between lowly and highly granular individuals
was significant after 900 ms post-stimulus onset and remained
significant through 2700 ms (900–1200 ms: β = 45.5, t = 5.16,
p < 0.0001; 1200–1500 ms: β = 48.8, t = 6.07, p < 0.0001; 1500–
1800 ms: β= 40.0, t = 5.02, p < 0.0001; 1800–2100 ms: β= 26.2,
t = 3.23, p < 0.005; 2100–2400 ms: β= 30.9, t = 3.61, p < 0.001;
2400–2700 ms: β = 31.6, t = 3.83, p < 0.0001). We used alpha
level of 0.005 to make Bonferroni corrections on 10 time bins.
No emotion category main effect or interaction of granularity and
emotion category was observed in this frequency band.
Next, we analyzed gamma ERS. Gamma oscillation increased
after the stimulus onset (ERS) as shown in Figure 7. Contrary
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FIGURE 4 | Event-related potentials (ERP) waveforms of participants with higher (over 1 SD) and lower (under 1 SD) granularity (for demonstration
purposes) in four brain regions (C: central, F: frontal, P: posterior, T: temporal): The 150 ms pre-stimulus period was used as the baseline.
to the alpha band, the effect of granularity was minimal, but
we found a main effect of emotion category and interactions
between granularity and emotion category in gamma band ERS.
The main effect of granularity in the gamma band was significant
only between 900 and 1200 ms (β = −14.74, F = 10.08,
p < 0.005). Individuals high in granularity tended to show lower
ERS compared to the low granular people in these time bins. The
main effect of emotion category was significant in all bins except
for 0–300 ms, as Table 4 shows, meaning the power of gamma
oscillation was influenced by the emotion category seen over
the time of image presentation. The interaction of granularity
and emotion category was significant between 300–600 ms and
900–1200 ms, where high granular people showed less ERS while
viewing disgust stimuli (β=−38.8, t =−4.70, p < 0.0001), 900–
1200 (β = −35.2, t = −3.79, p = 0.0002), and also between 1800
and 2400 ms, where high granular people showed less ERS while
viewing excitement stimuli (β = −74.4, t = −5.46, p < 0.0001;
β=−64.2, t=−4.58, p< 0.0001). There was no interaction effect
associated with brain regions (main effects exist between 600 and
2700 ms).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Consistent with our a priori hypotheses, individuals who were
high vs. low in granularity showed different neural patterns
during the experience of emotions at multiple time frames.
This finding is made all the more interesting based on the
fact that granularity was assessed as an individual difference
based on daily experiences that occurred 2 days before the
in-lab assessment of emotion-related ERPs and ERD/ERS. Of
course, our findings are the first to examine the relationship
between granularity and EEG-based measures of brain activity,
so many of our hypotheses are preliminary and even exploratory
in nature. Furthermore, although we situate our hypotheses in
the (CAT) of emotion, the link between specific psychological
mechanisms predicted by the CAT and specific ERP and
ERD/ERS outcomes remain hypothetical at this point in time and
certainly requires further validation. For each of the ERP and
ERD/ERS findings, we discuss whether findings were consistent
with our a priori hypotheses and offer preliminary interpretations
of our findings.
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FIGURE 5 | Event-related potential waveforms for five different emotions in four brain regions (C: central, F: frontal, P: posterior, T: temporal): The
150 ms pre-stimulus period was used as the baseline.
TABLE 2 | Main effects of emotion category on event-related potential (ERP) amplitude.
Time bin Emo main effect Awe Excite Fear Disgust
330–360 ms F = 9.72, p < 0.0001 β = −1.46, t = −4.78,
p < 0.0001
360–390 ms F = 11.18, p < 0.0001 β = 1.07, t = 3.57,
p = 0.0004
β = 0.94, t = 3.12,
p = 0.0019
β = −1.53, t = −5.11,
p < 0.0001
390–420 ms F = 12.13, p < 0.0001 β = 1.00, t = 3.34,
p = 0.0009
β = 1.20, t = 4.01,
p < 0.0001
β = −1.69, t = −5.65,
p < 0.0001
420–450 ms F = 14.88, p < 0.0001 β = 1.80, t = 5.75,
p < 0.0001
β = −1.89, t = −6.04,
p < 0.0001
450–480 ms F = 15.84, p < 0.0001 β = 2.17, t = 6.83,
p < 0.0001
β = −1.73, t = −5.44,
p < 0.0001
480–510 ms F = 14.23, p < 0.0001 β = 2.26, t = 6.91,
p < 0.0001
β = −1.14, t = −3.49,
p = 0.0005
510–540 ms F = 15.75, p < 0.0001 β = 1.94, t = 6.48,
p < 0.0001
β = −1.43, t = −4.79,
p < 0.0001
540–570 ms F = 13.97, p < 0.0001 β = 1.76, t = 5.68,
p < 0.0001
β = −1.75, t = −5.66,
p < 0.0001
Effects of Granularity and Emotion on
ERP Patterns
Our ERP analysis focused on the first 600 ms after the stimulus
onset and as predicted showed impacts of granularity on the
neural processing of emotion at early, middle and late stages of
the stimulus presentation. These findings are in and of themselves
interesting and important, insofar as granularity is an individual
difference variable that was measured independently from neural
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TABLE 3 | Interaction between granularity and emotion category on ERP amplitude.
Time bin Gran ∗ Emo
interaction
Awe Excite Fear Disgust
0–30 ms F = 5.32, p < 0.001 β = −4.03, t = −3.90, p < 0.0001
90–120 ms F = 6.60, p < 0.0001 β = 4.45, t = 3.26, p = 0.0012 β = −5.57, t = −4.90, p < 0.0001
180–210 ms F = 5.34, p < 0.001 β = 6.21, t = 4.09, p < 0.0001
210–240 ms F = 8.67, p < 0.0001 β = 8.74, t = 5.15, p < 0.0001 β = −6.38, t = −3.76, p < 0.001
240–270 ms F = 6.13, p < 0.0001 β = 7.03, t = 4.32, p < 0.0001 β = −5.38, t = −3.31, p < 0.001
FIGURE 6 | Alpha ERD (8–12 Hz) in four brain regions (C: central, F: frontal, P: posterior, T: temporal): The 150 ms pre-stimulus period was used as the
baseline. Red line is an average ERD of five participants whose granularity was above one sigma of average granularity. Blue line is an average ERD of four
participants whose granularity was below one sigma of average granularity. The 150 ms pre-stimulus period was used as the baseline.
responses to emotionally evocative images. This suggests that
a person’s level of granularity is influencing how their brain
represents emotional experiences, starting from the very initial
moments of stimulus presentation.
For instance, the first significant main effect of granularity
occurred between 60 and 90 ms, in which low granularity
individuals showed more negative amplitudes. Little is known
about this time frame, but it may reflect early attention to
affectively evocative stimuli. For instance, Jiang et al. (2014)
observed a greater negativity approximately 50 ms after stimulus
onset, which they refer to as the N50. Of relevance to the
present report, participants in Jiang et al.’s study had a greater
N50 to negative vs. positive words (Jiang et al., 2014). Similarly,
Hofmann et al. (2009) found greater negativity to positive and
highly arousing words (as compared to neutral words) in a
slightly later, yet still quite early (i.e., 80–120 ms) time frame.
Both of these ERP components are earlier than the N1 and
P1, which are known to respond to the affective valence and
arousal of stimuli. Since little is known about this time frame,
we use caution when interpreting our findings, but they could
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FIGURE 7 | Gamma ERS (30–50 Hz) in four brain regions (C: central, F: frontal, P: posterior, T: temporal): The 150 ms pre-stimulus period was used as
the baseline. Red line is an average ERS of five participants whose granularity was above one sigma of average granularity. Blue line is an average ERS of four
participants whose granularity was below one sigma of average granularity.
TABLE 4 | Emotion effect on gamma ERS.
Time bin Emotion Awe Excite Fear Disgust
300–600 ms F = 4.86, p < 0.001 β = −4.79, t = −3.77, p = 0.0002 β = 3.92, t = 3.09, p = 0.0021
600–900 ms F = 6.04, p < 0.0001 β = −3.45, t = −2.81, p = 0.0051 β = 4.26, t = 3.47, p = 0.0006
900–1200 ms F = 10.06, p < 0.0001 β = −4.68, t = −3.28, p = 0.0011 β = 4.75, t = 3.33, p = 0.0009 β = 4.75, t = 3.33, p = 0.0009
1200–1500 ms F = 8.64, p < 0.0001 β = −5.02, t = −3.30, p = 0.0010 β = 7.29, t = 4.80, p < 0.0001
1500–1800 ms F = 6.09, p < 0.0001 β = 7.62, t = 4.28, p < 0.0001
1800–2100 ms F = 12.93, p < 0.0001 β = 14.66, t = 6.99, p < 0.0001
2100–2400 ms F = 16.68, p < 0.0001 β = 16.68, t = 7.70, p < 0.0001
2400–2700 ms F = 7.86, p < 0.0001 β = 10.73, t = 5.14, p < 0.0001
2700–3000 ms F = 12.06, p < 0.0001 β = 17.8, t = 6.79, p < 0.0001
suggest that lowly granular individuals may have greater initial
allocation of attention to emotionally evocative stimuli than
do highly granular individuals. Although we did not predict
this outcome, it is nonetheless interesting as the remainder
of our ERP findings showed evidence of greater amplitudes
in high granularity individuals, especially in the components
related to the conceptual processing of stimuli and executive
control that we predicted. Low granularity individuals may
thus have early reactivity to affective stimuli, but do not then
engage conceptual resources to help make meaning of their
reactions to affective stimuli. This could explain why lowly
granular individuals are ultimately worse at emotion regulation
(Barrett et al., 2001), because they have early reactivity to
evocative stimuli but then do not engage resources to help
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make meaning of and subsequently regulate their affective
responses.
Consistent with our hypotheses, we also observed main effects
of granularity during the middle stages of stimulus presentation,
particularly during the negativity between 270 and 300 ms post-
stimulus. This timeframe is associated with the N2 response,
and individuals high in granularity had a more negative N2
amplitude than individuals low in granularity. The N2 is generally
associated with “cognitive control” (Folstein and Van Petten,
2008), a concept that incorporates use of working memory,
initiation of behavioral responses and inhibition of pre-potent
responses. These findings suggest that highly granular individuals
may be accessing working memory to a greater degree than lowly
granular individuals during this early-to-middle timeframe of
the emotional experience. Consistent with the CAT’s hypothesis
that discrete emotions emerge in consciousness when affective
reactions are made meaningful as instances of anger, disgust,
fear, etc. using concept knowledge (Lindquist and Barrett, 2008a),
greater N2 activity may reflect high granularity individuals’
greater use of WMC to access relevant conceptual knowledge
(e.g., to access conceptual knowledge about “anger” when viewing
an angry image), but also to inhibit irrelevant conceptual
knowledge (e.g., to inhibit conceptual knowledge about “disgust,”
“fear,” and “sadness” when viewing an angry image). Since the
N2 has been associated with activity within the dACC (e.g., Luus
et al., 2007), these findings also converge with Lane et al.’s (1998)
findings that individuals higher in emotional awareness, another
form of emotional complexity, show greater dACC activity
during emotions. The fact that executive control is occurring
relatively early in the stimulus presentation (around 270 ms)
is consistent with the CAT’s hypothesis that granularity stems
from a systematic difference in the engagement of executive
control and conceptual processes during emotionally evocative
events, not merely as a product of labeling after the emotion has
occurred.
Finally, we observed main effects of granularity in the
later (540–570 ms) range of stimulus presentation. Here, high
granularity individuals again had a greater and more sustained
positive amplitude than low granularity individuals, reflecting
a greater LPP. The related LPP is thought to be involved in
“motivated attention,” and executive control (Hajcak et al., 2009)
and seems to be particularly involved when meaning is made
of stimuli. For instance, the LPP is observed during emotion
regulation when the emotional meaning of stimuli is reappraised
as having a different meaning (Moser et al., 2006; Hajcak and
Nieuwenhuis, 2006; Foti and Hajcak, 2008). Although some
models conceive of a difference between emotion generation
and emotion regulation (Barrett et al., 2001), the CAT does not
draw firm distinctions between these processes. According to
the CAT, both the initial categorization of one’s affective state,
as well as later re-conceptualization during emotion regulatory
strategies, involves the same basic processes: categorization. We
thus predicted and found that individuals higher in granularity
are recruiting attentional resources to a greater extent for the
categorization of the meaning of their affective states.
By contrast to these main effects of granularity, the main
effect of experiencing specific emotions influenced brain activity
primarily in the later, 330–540 ms range. This range of ERPs
is associated with components such as the P300, N400, and
LPP, which are related to motivated attention, cognitive control,
and meaning processing. These findings are consistent with
the Conceptual Act Theory’s hypothesis that discrete emotions
emerge in consciousness only when meaning is made of early
affective (positive and negative) responses to stimuli (Lindquist
and Barrett, 2008a). The fact that experiences of discrete
emotions are differentiated only during this middle phase
associated with access to conceptual knowledge is consistent
with the constructionist hypothesis that discrete emotions
(e.g., fear vs. disgust; awe vs. excitement) are constructed
phenomena that are not instantly and automatically triggered
by a stimulus. Rather, the Conceptual Act Theory predicts that
individuals experience relatively automatic valenced affective
responses early on (as indicated by the P1 and N1) that are
subsequently made meaningful as fear vs. disgust or awe vs.
excitement when conceptual knowledge is accessed to categorize
the meaning of the affective state in late processing stages.
Since we did not have a priori hypotheses about how emotions
would differ from one another, we do not interpret the mean
differences listed in Table 2. However, it is notable that awe
and excitement were generally associated with relatively more
positive amplitudes than neutral, and that fear and disgust
were associated with relatively more negative amplitudes than
neutral. It should be noted that although it is possible that
the ERP differences are a product of the emotion category
used, we cannot rule out that differences in valence and
arousal are driving at least some of these ERP differences.
Although we attempted to equate valence and arousal in our
stimulus set (e.g., by matching awe and excitement and fear
and disgust in valence), there is still a difference in positive
vs. negative valence between awe/excitement and fear/disgust
as well as a difference in the arousal content of our stimuli
within valence. For instance, fear and excitement were on
average higher in arousal than disgust and awe (see Figure 1).
Nonetheless, this is one of relatively few studies to examine
main effects of different emotion categories as induced by
pictures on ERPs, and we look forward to future research
replicating and extending these findings. Indeed, growing work
is examining ERPs to discrete emotion categories. Other recent
studies compare specific discrete emotion category words (e.g.,
happiness) to words referencing the broader dimensions of
valence (e.g., positivity) (Briesemeister et al., 2014), compare
specific discrete emotion category words (e.g., disgust) to neutral
words (Ponz et al., 2013) or compare the effects of perceiving
different discrete emotional facial expressions to one another
(e.g., Müller, 2017; for a review of studies on the perception of
discrete facial expressions for emotion, see Eimer and Holmes,
2007).
It should be noted that many of the main effects observed
were qualified by interactions between granularity and emotion
category. Since we did not have a priori predictions about these
interactions, we again refrain from interpreting their direction.
However, it is worth noting that these interactions occurred
starting even in very early time frames and ranged until middle
time frames. Generally, these interactions suggest that some
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emotions peaked higher or lower than other emotions depending
on participants’ level of granularity and that granularity was
having an early effect on how the brain processed specific
emotion categories. These findings suggest that high vs. low
granularity individuals may be differentially sensitive to the low-
level visual cues present in the stimuli that are intended to
evoke certain emotional experiences, and moreover, that this
might be particularly the case for certain emotional experiences
over others. One finding that may be notable is the very early
(0–30 ms) negativity observed when highly granular individuals
viewed disgusting images. This time frame is too early for
true emotion differentiation to have occurred, but since stimuli
were blocked and subsequent stimuli within a block were thus
predictable to participants, these findings likely reflect highly
granular individuals’ greater anticipatory responding (see Teder-
Sälejärvi et al., 2002) to disgusting images. Although speculative
at this point, these findings imply that highly granular individuals
could have greater attention to emotionally evocative stimuli than
individuals lower in granularity, especially when they know to
expect such images. Such a finding could again be consistent
with the fact that individuals high in granularity are better at
emotion regulation than individuals low in granularity (Barrett
et al., 2001). When they know to expect emotionally evocative
stimuli, high granularity individuals may be more likely to
allocate attentional processes in order to anticipate their emotion
regulation needs. Highly granular individuals also responded
differently than lowly granular individuals to exciting and fearful
images at other early- to middle-range timeframes. We look
forward to future research that replicates and extends these
findings.
Effects of Granularity and Emotion on
ERD/ERS
We used ERD/ERS to describe the oscillations in populations
of neurons for a longer time frame (∼3 s) compared to the
ERP analysis (∼600 ms). Alpha oscillation generally decreased
over participants (alpha ERD), and lowly granular participants
experienced greater alpha ERD across all emotions as compared
to highly granular individuals. We predicted that individuals high
in granularity would show less alpha ERD and participants low
in granularity would show more alpha ERD during emotional
experiences. This finding is consistent with previous studies that
individuals high in emotional intelligence showed less alpha ERD
than individuals who are average in emotional intelligence, when
naming the meaning of facial expressions (Jaušovec et al., 2001;
Jaušovec and Jaušovec, 2005). As greater ERD has been associated
with attention that enables “controlled knowledge access and
semantic orientation,” one interpretation of this result is that
lowly granular people may have had to work harder to access
conceptual knowledge to make meaning of affective stimuli. By
contrast, the process of accessing concept knowledge to make
meaning of an affective state may be relatively automatic for
highly granular individuals. More broadly, this interpretation is
consistent with a neural efficiency account (Grabner et al., 2006),
which argues that more intelligent people require less cortical
activation to perform well on a psychological task than do less
intelligent people. For instance, highly intelligent people had
less upper alpha ERD on trials from the RAVEN intelligence
task that were relatively easy; less intelligent individuals had
higher ERD on the same easy trials (Doppelmayr et al., 2005).
By contrast, the difference in ERD between highly intelligent
people and lowly intelligent people was less pronounced on
difficult RAVEN trials. The neural efficiency account may thus
describe why high granularity individuals had less alpha ERD
during experiences of emotion. Highly granular individuals, who
may be more emotionally complex, may routinely construct
experiences of discrete emotion out of affective experiences,
whereas lowly granular individuals do not. In other words,
experiencing emotions in a discrete manner could be habitual
and “easy” for high granularity people, whereas lowly granular
individuals find the task more difficult. It is often thought that
the so-called “cognitive” processes involved in intelligence are
distinct from the so-called “emotional” processes involved in
the construction of emotional experiences, but there is reason
to believe that processes such as semantic retrieval and WMC
more generally are implicated in the construction of emotion
experiences (Barrett et al., 2004; Lindquist and Barrett, 2012).
We furthermore argue that WMC ultimately limits granularity,
insofar as individuals who are high in granularity must be
able to access and use conceptual knowledge to make meaning
of their affective states as discrete emotions in the moment.
Individuals who are low in WMC, regardless of the complexity
of their conceptual knowledge, should not be able to flexibly use
said knowledge (see Lindquist and Barrett, 2008b). The neural
efficiency hypothesis would thus suggest that individuals high in
granularity may be relatively more efficient at conceptualizing
the meaning of their affective states than individuals low in
granularity, meaning that their brain has to work less hard to
construct emotional experiences. Our findings are consistent with
this account.
Our gamma ERS result conformed to the alpha ERD results.
Increase in gamma ERS power can denote more effort in feature
integration, attention, stimulus selection, integration of sensory
inputs and sensorimotor activities, movement preparation, and
memory formation (Knyazev, 2007); lowly granular individuals
showed greater gamma ERS as compared to highly granular
individuals between 900 and 1200 ms during the emotional
experience. Interaction with discrete emotions signified such
effects. These findings may again imply that lowly granular
individuals had to allocate relatively more brain resources to
make semantic meaning of their affective responses. Relatively
stable gamma ERS of high granularity people may also fit the
interpretation that experiencing emotions in a discrete manner
is habitual for high granularity people. Of note, our gamma band
findings are opposite to Jaušovec and Jaušovec (2005), who found
that individuals high in emotional intellience had greater gamma
band ERS than individuals who were average in emotional
intelligence. However, Jaušovec and Jaušovec (2005) themselves
note that their findings were inconsistent with their own alpha
frequency findings as well as other evidence supporting the neural
efficiency account, so their gamma findings may be anomoulous.
Our gamma ERS findings are consistent with our alpha ERD
findings, Jaušovec and Jaušovec (2005)’s alpha ERD findings, as
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well as our predictions about neural efficiency for emotional
processing in high vs. low granularity individuals.
Emotion category and the interaction of granularity and
emotion did not predict differences in alpha ERD, but
we did observe main effects of emotion and interactions
between granularity and emotion for the gamma ERS findings.
We did not have a priori hypotheses about any of these
findings, so we refrain from drawing strong interpretations.
Nonetheless, our ERS findings, like our ERP findings,
preliminarily suggest that the degree to which a person
characteristically draws on conceptual knowledge of emotion
interacts differently with the specific emotion content being
experienced.
In sum, our findings are the first to use EEG to test
predictions of the Conceptual Act Theory, and the first to
examine differences in neural processes of individuals high
and low in granularity during emotions. Of course, there are
important limitations inherent in our study that should be
noted. For one, we are taking for granted that affective stimuli
induce emotional experiences and that we are measuring neural
reactions to emotional experiences as opposed to the mere
perception of stimuli. This is an assumption not unique to
our study; it is implicit in many studies that attempt to evoke
emotion in the lab using visual, auditory, or memory-based
inductions. However, our assumption is bolstered by meta-
analyses linking image-viewing to self-report and physiological
changes indicative of emotional experiences (e.g., Lench et al.,
2011) and norming studies linking specific types of images
to the experience of specific emotions (e.g., Mikels et al.,
2008). We are also drawing inferences that certain EEG
outcomes are indicative of the presence of certain psychological
processes (i.e., executive control) during emotions. We recognize
that neuroimaging-based methods such as EEG are ultimately
correlational and cannot provide inferences about causation.
Neuroimaging-based methods are also subject to the reverse
inference problem (Poldrack, 2006), in which the engagement
of a particular mental function is inferred from the presence
of certain neural activity. However, the fact that we predicted
the involvement of certain processes (e.g., executive control) in
emotions a priori begins to mitigate this concern. Ultimately,
converging evidence from other methods such as lesion-based
approaches can help confirm whether hypothesized processes
are involved in emotions and whether they are sufficient or
necessary.
Although preliminary, we believe our findings offer
important initial evidence that can spur future research. For
instance, findings from this research have important theoretical
consequence, as they can begin to weigh in on the temporal
dynamics of the neural processes involved during emotion, as
well as the temporal dynamics that are influenced by an emotion-
relevant individual difference (i.e., emotional granularity). Our
findings are of also of practical use in more applied domains,
such as in brain-computer interfaces in which neuroadaptive
systems attempt to use neurophysiological signals indexing the
user’s emotions to cause changes in functional characteristics
of the system. A neuroadaptive system can be used to provide
feedback to users based their emotional status while using the
system (Hettinger et al., 2003), but must ultimately be sensitive
to the individual differences that characterize emotion. As we’ve
shown here, granularity might be one such important individual
difference to consider in future applied research.
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